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IN HIS OWN WORDS:  JUDGE COFFIN AND 
WORKABILITY  
William C. Kelly, Jr.* 
Early in his judicial career, Judge Coffin proffered the concept of 
“workability” as one of the core factors in judging.  Justice and Workability: Un 
Essai, his first published reflection on this idea, appeared in the Suffolk University 
Law Review in 1971.  To frame the discussion, he started with a formal definition: 
“[T]he extent to which a rule protecting a right, enforcing a duty, or setting a 
standard of conduct—which is consistent with and in the interests of social 
justice—can be pronounced with reasonable expectation of effective observance 
without impairing the essential functioning of those to whom the rule applies.”1  
This Article explores the ways in which the concept of workability became richer 
over time as the Judge limned out its relationship to the decisions of the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court, pitting individual 
rights against the imperatives of governmental institutions and the jurisprudence of 
the era. 
I.  FORMATIVE EXPERIENCES 
As a backdrop, it bears reviewing briefly Judge Coffin’s long apprenticeship in 
government service prior to his appointment to the First Circuit in 1965.  His two-
term stint in the 85th and 86th Congresses, from 1957 to 1961, was followed by a 
series of executive branch positions in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations 
in the field of foreign aid, including service as Deputy Administrator of the United 
States Agency for International Development (AID) from 1961 to 1964, and as 
United States representative to the Development Assistance Committee of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1964-1965.  At AID 
in particular, he experienced firsthand the challenge and frustration of trying as a 
mid-level political appointee to merge and reform an executive branch agency and 
the disconcerting experience, after having served in Congress, of dealing from the 
outside with Congressional moguls.2  When he took his seat on the Court of 
Appeals, he brought the experience and wisdom earned in Congress and the 
executive branch.  In styling his extraordinary, three-volume autobiography Life 
and Times in the Three Branches, the Judge embraced this perspective on his life’s 
work.   
Less a part of the standard narrative, but explored in his autobiography, is his 
earlier experience in government at the local level.  After clerking for two years for 
United States District Court Judge Robert Clifford in Maine after law school, he 
launched a solo law practice in Lewiston, Maine, and was quickly drawn into the 
                                                                                                     
 * President, Stewards of Affordable Housing for the Future.  B.A. Harvard, 1968; J.D. Yale Law 
School, 1971.  The Author had the privilege of serving as a law clerk to Judge Coffin during the 1971-
1972 term, and to Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. during the October 1972 term. 
 1. Frank M. Coffin, Justice and Workability: Un Essai, 5 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 567, 571 (1971). 
 2. 2 FRANK M. COFFIN, LIFE AND TIMES IN THE THREE BRANCHES 484-515 (2004) [hereinafter 
LIFE AND TIMES].   
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day-to-day work of local government, first as a member of Lewiston’s underfunded 
Board of Education and its Pension and Planning Boards.3  A year later, he became 
Lewiston’s part-time Corporation Counsel.   
In one sense, workability likely had its origins in these modest roles.  Judge 
Coffin’s duties exposed him first hand to the pressures of local self-government 
and its chronic shortage of time and resources.  Night meetings of the city boards 
competed with law practice and family life.4  As it turned out, many of the toughest 
cases the First Circuit faced during his tenure, and many of the most significant 
opinions the Judge wrote for the court, would concern the laws and practices of 
state and local government. 
II.  WORKABILITY IN ACTION 
A sampling of Judge Coffin’s opinions from the decade surrounding his 
Suffolk University Law Review piece illustrates a variety of contexts in which he 
found that workability had application across a range of local, state, and federal 
institutions.  In each opinion, the Judge, writing for the court, took pains to view 
the case from the perspective of the implementing body.  Empathetic to his core, 
Judge Coffin also believed deeply in transparency and dialogue.  He brought to his 
every public endeavor the belief of a determined optimist that the participants could 
educate one another as they worked together towards a better future.    
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potentially causing administrators to become over-cautious in their initial hiring 
and to avoid the “time, expense, and often the personal discomfort of a full scale 
hearing”10 by keeping teachers that should be let go.  In a statement that surely took 
much of its meaning from his personal service on an overworked school board, 
Judge Coffin wrote that imposing an adjudicative hearing to flush out possible bad 
faith “would spawn a host of other problems not the least of which would be the 
erosion of the educational policy function of school boards.”11     
The Judge recognized that judicial sensitivity to the demands placed on an 
institution required reciprocity on the side of the institution.  Workability 
sometimes foundered on the shoals of recalcitrance.  In Morgan v. Kerrigan,12 the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment that the Boston school 
board and other defendants had intentionally created or maintained racial 
discrimination in several respects.13  It was clear that dialogue had failed in the face 
of official defiance.  Judge Coffin’s opinion for the court invoked Justice 
Frankfurter’s concurrence in Cooper v. Aaron,14 quoting its key passage: “‘Only 
the constructive use of time will achieve what an advanced civilization demands 
and the Constitution confirms.’ And the constructive use of time necessarily 
depends upon ‘the fruitful exercise of the responsibility of those charged with 
political official power.’”15  
B.  Draft Boards 
Controversies growing out of the Vietnam War also populated the court’s 
docket in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  While several cases dealt with wider 
public controversies,16 most were appeals from convictions of young men for 
refusing to submit for induction into the military.  Like school boards, Selective 
Service System draft boards were then, and still are, composed of local volunteers, 
and considerations of workability were featured prominently in Judge Coffin’s 
opinions.  
Typically, the appellants in the draft cases challenged the decisions of local 
draft boards to classify them as eligible to be drafted, and multiple opinions by 
Judge Coffin conveyed decisions reversing convictions or remanding cases for 
further proceedings.  The opinions were careful to take into account the local, 
volunteer character of draft boards.  Sounding a note that would persist through 
other cases, Judge Coffin wrote for the court in Talmanson v. United States,17 that 
“[s]o long as we have a system entrusting the application of national policy to local 
                                                                                                     
 10. Id. at 1186. 
 11. Id. at 1187.  In Drown II, the court declined to interpose itself further after finding sufficient the 
school board’s statement that the teacher’s department had found her uncooperative in various respects.  
Drown II, 451 F.2d at 1109.  
 12. 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974). 
 13. Id. at 588. 
 14. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).  
 15. Morgan, 509 F.2d at 598 (quoting Cooper, 358 U.S. at 25). 
 16. See, e.g., In re Ellsberg, 446 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1971); Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st 
Cir. 1971); United States v. Doe, 460 F.2d 328 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 
(1st Cir. 1969). 
 17. 386 F.2d 811 (1st Cir. 1967). 
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units vested with discretion, there will be—as, indeed, it is intended that there be—
variations in assessing area needs and availabilities.”18  When a draftee argued that 
an order issued by a clerk to implement a board decision deprived him of the right 
to have the board exercise its discretion, the court concluded in another opinion by 
Judge Coffin that “[t]o rule as a matter of law that every order to report must be the 
subject of board action seems to us a requirement unnecessarily burdensome on 
local boards and not demanded by the duty to treat registrants fairly.”19   
In United States v. Baldridge,20 another registrant challenged a regulation that 
cut off new claims of deferment when a draft notice had been mailed.  Unwilling to 
require endless process, the court, through Judge Coffin, declined to overturn the 
regulation, noting that “[b]ut for the regulation, a large percentage of those 
receiving induction notices might attempt to avoid induction by suddenly 
unearthing deferrable pursuits.  The effect on the ability smoothly to supply the 
needs of the military for draftees could well be disastrous.”21  The case before it, 
though, presented unusual circumstances—the registrat had accepted an 
employment offer from the Peace Corps before the issuance of the draft notice—
that the court felt merited relief and should be accommodated by the board.22  
“[T]he local boards would not be unduly burdened by the need to reopen the 
classifications of the few who are likely to be situated similarly to [the 
appellant].”23  
C.  Prison Officials 
Challenges to the rules imposed by state prison officials raised analogous 
questions about the extent to which a judicial decision might impose processes that 
would hinder the ability of the officials to do their basic work, even though those 
officials are paid government employees rather than citizen volunteers.  In Nolan v. 
Fitzpatrick,24 the court faced a claim by a state prisoner that he had a constitutional 
right to send letters to the news media concerning conditions in Massachusetts’ 
Walpole prison, where he was confined.25  After careful analysis of the burden 
imposed on prison officials by their felt need to review prisoners’ letters to the 
press and perhaps make a public response, the court concluded that the burden was 
modest and warranted.26  Ever alert to the possibility of dialogue27 with institutional 
                                                                                                     
 18. Id. at 812.  
 19. United States v. Powers, 413 F.2d 834, 841 (1st Cir. 1969).  See also Frank M. Coffin, Chief 
Judge, U.S. Ct. of App. for the 1st Cir., Address at the Examiner Club: The Continuing Quest for 
Principle 33 (Nov. 5, 1973) (on file with Author) [hereinafter Address at the Examiner Club] (“[E]ven 
the best constituted lay draft board must be given some leeway.  And if they were held to the punctilio 
of perfection, they would simply not be able to carry out their function.”). 
 20. 454 F.2d 403 (1st Cir. 1972).   
 21. Id. at 406. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id.  
 24. 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971). 
 25. Id. at 546.  See also Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548, 550 (1st Cir. 1970) (allegation of refusal to 
forward a prisoner’s letter to the Massachusetts Civil Liberties Union states a claim that prison 
disciplinary proceedings deprived him of access to the courts).  
 26. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d at 550. 
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defendants, Judge Coffin, writing for the court, added a postscript to highlight a 
“welcome constructive step”:  “Subsequent to argument in this case, we have been 
informed by counsel that defendants have voluntarily adopted new procedures 
permitting outgoing mail of prisoners to be sent without restriction as to 
addressees.”28 
Palmigiano v. Baxter29 posed the question whether the prison system was 
required as a matter of due process to provide counsel to prisoners in disciplinary 
hearings.30  For the court, Judge Coffin wrote:  
[W]e do not feel that prison disciplinary hearings necessarily require 
professionally trained counsel.  The requirement of professionally trained counsel 
in all cases could amount to a significant expense for the government, both in 
supplying counsel for the accused and, because the hearing is likely to become 
more adversarial as a result, in prolonging the proceeding and making it necessary 
for the state to be represented by its own attorney.31  
Fano v. Meachum32 again addressed the due process rights of prisoners.  Judge 
Coffin wrote that the Massachusetts prison system could not transfer a prisoner to a 
higher security prison based on informants’ confidential statements.33  The Judge 
took comfort in the fact that another prison in the same system had implemented a 
regulation barring the acceptance of informant statements without the presence of 
the accused.34  Judge Coffin noted that “the prison system itself had decided that it 
could live with the requirement of a hearing without difficulty.”35  
D.  The Police 
A case that shuttled between the United States District Court in Massachusetts 
and the Court of Appeals illustrates the dynamic between general principles and 
practicality in the ongoing relationship of the federal courts with state and local 
government.  Castro v. Beecher36 led the First Circuit into the treacherous waters of 
de facto racial discrimination in the North.  At the time, blacks constituted 16.3% 
of Boston’s population but only 3.6% of its police force.37  The case involved a 
challenge by black and Spanish-speaking plaintiffs to the hiring practices for 
policemen in Massachusetts, principally a civil service examination that screened 
out a disproportionate percentage of black and Hispanic candidates.38   
                                                                                                     
 27. The Judge saw dialogue between the courts and other governmental institutions as a corollary to 
workability: “[W]hen judges succeed in involving the parties in working out institutional changes, more, 
much more is accomplished than settling the rights and liabilities of the parties to the dispute.”  Address 
at the Examiner Club, supra note 19, at 38. 
 28. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d at 551.  
 29. 487 F.2d 1280 (1st Cir. 1973). 
 30. Id. at 1290. 
 31. Id. at 1291. 
 32. 520 F.2d 374 (1st Cir. 1975).  
 33. Id. at 379-80. 
 34. Id. at 380. 
 35. FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 291 (1994). 
 36. 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972). 
 37. Id. at 728. 
 38. Id. 
